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Abstract 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being 
applied to law and a myriad of legal tasks amid 
attempts to bolster AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) 
autonomous capabilities. A major question that has 
generally been unaddressed involves how we will 
know when AILR has achieved autonomous 
capacities. The field of AI has grappled with similar 
quandaries over how to assess the attainment of 
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), a persistently 
discussed issue among scholars since the inception of 
AI, with the Turing Test communally being considered 
as the bellwether for ascertaining such matters. This 
paper proposes a variant of the Turing Test that is 
customized for specific use in the AILR realm, 
including depicting how this famous “gold standard” 
of AI fulfillment can be robustly applied across the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning. 
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1 Background and Context 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being 
applied to law and legal tasks amid attempts to bolster 
AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) autonomous capabilities 
[1] [5] [11] [17]. The use of Machine Learning (ML) 
and Deep Learning (DL) has significantly aided in 
making improvements and advances in AILR systems 
[27] [31]. Also, ML/DL in Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) has made tremendous strides in 
computational fluency and semantic analysis 
performance that has bolstered the use of LegalTech 
for e-Discovery, contract creation, searches of a large 
corpus of court cases, and the like [14] [26] [40]. 
 
A major question that has generally been unaddressed 
involves how we will know when AILR has achieved 
autonomous capacities. So far, AI as applied to the 
legal profession has primarily consisted of aiding or 
supporting the legal work of human lawyers but has 
not reached the capability of being able to 
autonomously perform legal tasks. A base assumption 
is that inexorably there will be advances made in AI 
that will boost AILR systems and ultimately transcend 
them into having autonomous capacities, but there 
does not yet exist any bona fide and nor rigorous 
means to viably attest to whether such AILR 
autonomy has been achieved [44]. 
 
Without an acknowledged and universally accepted 
method or means of attesting to AILR autonomy, a 
vacuum remains that will likely stoke false claims and 
confound those within the law industry and those 
outside the legal field. Vendors providing AILR 
systems will continue to be able to assert they have 
been able to develop autonomous AILR, doing so with 
shallow assertions buoyed-up by whatever obtuse 
measures they wish to stake such a claim on. Likewise, 
AI and law researchers that are striving to make 
scholarly foundational advances in AILR will lack any 
viable means to discern the pace and scope of progress 
in creating AILR autonomous functionality. 
 
The overarching field of AI has grappled with alike 
quandaries concerning how to assess the attainment of 
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). AGI refers to the 
goal of seeking to achieve AI that can be on par with 
human intelligence and thus convincingly demonstrate 
the same caliber and depth of reasoning as that of 
human cognition. Discussion and debates over how to 
assess whether AGI has been attained have permeated 
the field of AI since its very inception. Generally, the 
Turing Test [52] has commonly been considered the 
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bellwether for ascertaining such matters and is known 
worldwide as a method or approach to the testing of 
AI, having been devised by the famous mathematician 
Alan Turing in 1950 [39] [41] [47] [51]. 
 
This paper proposes a variant of the Turing Test that is 
customized for specific use in the AILR realm, 
including depicting how this renowned “gold 
standard” of AI fulfillment can be robustly applied to 
AILR. Also, the paper makes use of a framework of 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning [20] [21] 
[24], indicating how the Turing Test applies at each 
successive level of AILR autonomy. The proposed 
grid and discussion are intended to contribute to the 
study of AI & Law as this burgeoning realm seeks to 
identify and mature a method or means to suitably 
determine and formally assess AI Legal Reasoning 
autonomous systems. 
 
This paper consists of five sections: 
• Section 1: Background and Context 
• Section 2: Key Elements of the Turing Test 
• Section 3: Autonomous Levels of AI Legal 
                 Reasoning 
• Section 4: Turing Test Grid Integrating 
                 Autonomous Levels of AILR 
• Section 5: Additional Considerations and  
                 Future Research 
 
In Section 1, an overall background about the Turing 
Test is provided. Section 2 then goes into a further in-
depth analysis of the Turing Test and identifies the key 
elements involved. In Section 3, an overview is 
provided on the autonomous levels of AI Legal 
Reasoning, which is crucial to then understanding 
Section 4. Section 4 proposes a grid that aligns the 
Turing Test elements with the autonomous levels of 
AI Legal Reasoning. Section 5 is a discussion of 
additional considerations and also offers suggested 
avenues for future research on these matters. 
 
1.1 Overview of the Turing Test 
  
Noted mathematician Alan Turing proposed the 
Turing Test in 1950 when trying to address the 
question of whether machines can think [52]. He was 
desirous of avoiding getting mired in debates about 
what thinking consists of, which can readily get 
hindered in the murky and unknown underpinnings of 
the brain and cognition. Note that even today, some 70 
years later, the means of how we think are still largely 
undetermined.  
 
The overarching notion by Turing was to treat thinking 
as a black box and thus not need to ascertain the 
internal mechanisms. He conceived of a testing 
approach that would avert relying upon how thinking 
is derived, and instead be aimed at the resultant 
behavior that thinking produces. He also wanted to 
separate the physical aspects of thinking from the 
intellectual aspects. In essence, a thinking machine 
does not necessarily need to have a human body or any 
semblance of a body, and might instead be 
encapsulated in a computer-based system that does not 
showcase itself in a human-like way (i.e., it does not 
need to be a robot that has the appearance of a human 
figure). 
 
Some immediately criticized the Turing Test for 
averting the ongoing question of mind-body, whereby 
some theorists suggest that the human mind and the act 
of thinking are intertwined, and it is not possible to 
separate the two [41] [55]. This criticism though is 
addressed by the simple fact that the test as devised 
would presumably lead to a failure on the part of the 
AI if indeed a mind-body composition is an absolute 
requirement for the act of thinking since the AI would 
assuredly be unable to demonstrate thinking as it has 
no such body or encasement included. 
 
Per Turing [52], he stated that “It is natural that we 
should wish to permit every kind of engineering 
technique to be used in our machines,” and thus he 
wanted to devise a test that would not limit how a 
thinking machine could be developed. He also 
anticipated the retort that if any machine is allowed, 
potentially a person might be cloned via biological 
techniques, and this “machine” considered a form of 
AI due to it being “engineered” into existence. Turing 
[52] remarked that “To do so would be a feat of 
biological technique deserving of the very highest 
praise, but we would not be inclined to regard it as a 
case of ‘constructing a thinking machine.’” 
 
Therefore, it is assumed that for the sake of the Turing 
Test, a reasonableness perspective be taken about the 
AI and how it is embodied and that it somehow is 
considered to be commonly denoted as a “machine” 
and not a biological person (trying to definitively 
define the meaning of “machine” can in itself be a 
significant burden). 
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The Turing Test that he devised consists of a person 
that takes the role of conducting an interrogation, 
asking questions of two subjects or participants, one 
being a human and the other being a (potential) 
thinking machine, and neither is visible to the 
interrogator. Imagine that the two subjects are hidden 
behind a curtain on a stage and that the interrogator 
can only interact indirectly via speaking or writing a 
message to them but cannot see them directly. This 
hiding of the subjects aids in what otherwise would be 
a rather perfunctory exercise of merely looking at the 
participants and visually ascertaining which is the 
human and which is the machine (assuming that the 
machine is not a robot fashioned to look identically 
like a human). 
 
The interrogator does not know beforehand which of 
the two is the human and nor which of the two is the 
AI. For sake of convenience, label one of them as X 
and the other as Y. The interrogator asks questions or 
makes queries of the X and Y, and at some point, 
ascertains that the effort should be concluded. Upon so 
ending the effort, the interrogator is then to state 
whether X is the human or whether Y is the human, 
which alternatively could be stated by indicating 
whether X is the AI or whether Y is the AI. 
 
Turing referred to this test as the “imitation game” 
since it involves the AI attempting to imitate the 
human, though this might or might not be the intention 
per se of the AI. It could be that the AI has been 
devised to be a thinking machine, and thus it “mimics” 
the act of human thinking. Whether this kind of 
thinking is the same as human thinking is a 
longstanding open debate, therefore that can be 
somewhat sidestepped by suggesting that the AI is 
mimicking human thinking, regardless of whether it is, 
in fact, identical in how it thinks or does so in an 
entirely different manner. 
 
Many prefer to refer to the imitation game as the 
Turing Test, rather than mentioning that it is a game, 
which perhaps undermines the cogent value of the 
approach. When considering games or contests, we 
might be quick to dismiss them as nothing of 
worthwhile consequence. Some suggest too that the 
Turing Test is more so an experimental arrangement, 
and thusly refer to the human participant and the AI as 
subjects, akin to the phrasing used in scientific 
experiments.  
 
The aim of the Turing Test is that if the interrogator is 
unable to differentiate between the two subjects, 
presumably the AI is thusly indistinguishable from the 
human, in terms of thinking, and thus we can conclude 
that the AI has achieved the equivalence of human 
intelligence. This greatly simplifies the seemingly 
intractable problem of trying to define what human 
intelligence consists of. If the AI can demonstrate 
intelligence to the same degree as a human, it can be 
said to be a thinking machine. 
 
When pursuing the consideration of human 
intelligence, Turing envisioned that a question and 
answer dialogue would be a key means for the 
integrator to try and separate the chaff from the wheat, 
so to speak, and assumed that the interrogator is 
sufficiently capable undertaking the interrogation, and 
ultimately able to reach a reasoned conclusion about 
which is the human and which is the AI. Turing 
suggested that the interrogator might ask the subjects 
to write poetry, or play chess, or do whatever kinds of 
mentally engaging tasks that might be deemed 
worthwhile for purposes of conducting the test. 
 
The Turing Test has been pervasive in the field of AI 
over the many years since it was first proposed and 
continues today as a commonly referred to “standard” 
of how to assess the achievement of machine-based 
human-like intelligence [3] [4] [39]. Various 
tournaments have taken place using the Turing Test, 
along with prizes offered for being able to devise AI 
that can succeed at winning a Turing Test. It is crucial 
though to realize that none of these various Turing 
Tests were of the variety envisioned by Turing, and 
instead are extremely reduced versions, oftentimes 
limiting the test to a pre-determined scope or a set time 
limit. Thus, there is not yet any AI that has been able 
to successfully win or pass a Turing Test of an 
unencumbered nature that was robustly attempting to 
ascertain general intelligence. 
 
Some have used the Turing Test to examine AI in 
specific disciplines. For example, in the medical field, 
there are AI systems that purportedly exhibit human 
intelligence capacities when analyzing an X-ray or 
MRI, and thus a type of Turing Test can be set up to 
try and determine the veracity of such medically 
specialized claims [42] [57]. Note that this is not the 
same as determining general intelligence and instead 
of a focus on so-called narrow AI. 
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In the field of law, efforts to apply AI to legal 
reasoning have also at times referred to the Turing 
Test, proposing that it be utilized for ascertaining the 
capabilities of AI LegalTech systems. Such 
suggestions have not been laid out in specified detail 
and are typically an overall reference to the 
importance and potential applicability of using the 
Turing Test in the application of AI to the law [41] 
[45]. 
 
In an unusual and intriguing perspective about the 
Turing Test, Reinbold [44] discusses the Turing Test 
in the context of patents. Currently, the United States 
does not allow AI to be considered a patent inventor, 
but some argue that AI ought to be permitted to hold a 
patent. Reinbold suggests that the Turing Test could be 
used to aid in deciding whether AI should be eligible 
for being granted a patent [44]: “Principally, AI that 
passes the Turing Test constitutes ‘inventive AI’ and 
likely produces unpatentable inventions under 35 
U.S.C. § 103. In contrast, AI that fails the Turing Test 
permits user control and influence over the inventive 
process and may result in patentable ‘AI-assisted 
inventions.’” In short, if the AI passes the Turing Test, 
it cannot be granted a patent under existing provisions, 
while if it fails then it could potentially be considered 
an AI-assisted invention. 
 
Overall, there is a gap or opening within the field of 
AI and law that leaves unstated how we will know 
when AI has reached a sufficiency of being able to 
practice law and thus might be permitted to do so, 
autonomously rather than via working solely on a 
human attorney-assisted basis. This paper proposes 
that the Turing Test be tailored to the discipline of law, 
and by doing so would provide a means to assess AI 
applications purporting to perform legal reasoning. 
 
In the next section, this paper identifies the key 
elements involved in the Turing Test and discusses 
how those elements can be tailored or customized to 
the assessment of AI-based Legal Reasoning.  
 
2 Key Elements of the Turing Test 
 
In this section, the key elements of the Turing Test are 
identified. An explanation for each key element is 
provided. This will be crucial for then applying these 
elements to the autonomous levels of AILR. 
 
2.1 Turing Test and Key Elements 
 
The key elements are depicted in the below short-form 
descriptors that are considered suitable for use in a 
grid and consist of keywords to represent each 
element. The key elements consist of: 
• The Inquirer 
• Human Participant 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner 
• Queries of the Turing Test 
• Answers to the Turing Test 
• Rules of the Turing Test 
• Potential Observers 
• Conclusion Reached 
• Reverse Turing Test 
 
In the subsections, each key element will be briefly 
explained and explored. 
 
2.2 Details Underlying Key Elements 
 
For each of the key elements, it is foundational to 
explain the nature and scope of the element, doing so 
to ensure that each is representative of its focused 
intent. 
 
2.2.1 Element “The Inquirer” 
 
The person that asks the questions of the Turing Test 
participants is customarily known as the interrogator, 
which was the wording originally used by Turing in 
describing the overall arrangement. Since the word 
“interrogator” can have varied connotations associated 
with it, which invokes for some a semblance of 
antagonism or other definitional baggage, the person 
in the role of conducting the inquiry has oft been 
coined as the inquirer. There are additional wording 
variations such as being referred to as the evaluator, 
sometimes also referred to as the judge, and so on. 
 
For purposes of this study, the word “inquirer” is 
utilized.  
 
Doing so is for purposes of seeking to avoid any 
otherwise distracting confusion or confounding 
considerations about the role. The word “inquirer” is 
presumed to be less likely to trigger any adverse 
reactions about the nature of the role and thus is 
considered a relatively neutral phrasing. Regardless of 
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the phrasing chosen, the role is still the same role as 
originally envisioned. 
 
One question to be considered about the inquirer is 
whether this is denoted as one person or whether it 
could be more than one. The original portrayal implied 
it would be one person, though this was not an aspect 
that garnered particular attention or was raised as a 
potential consideration in the initial arrangement. 
 
The viewpoint taken here is that it would be feasible to 
have a Turing Test with more than one inquirer, which 
is a reasonable stance given that the role of the inquiry 
overall is to try and assess the full range of human 
intelligence and whether the AI can exhibit that entire 
range. It would seem problematic to assume that one 
person alone in the inquirer role could cover the varied 
breadth and depth of human intelligence, and as such, 
there might be multiple inquirers employed for the 
role. Ideally, the number of inquirers would be kept to 
a reasonable number and there would be cogent 
coordination among the inquirers too. This concept of 
multiple persons in the inquirer role is deserving of 
additional research and will be mentioned further in 
Section 5. When using the word “inquirer,” henceforth 
herein this is intended to indicate the role of the 
inquirer and for which it might be one or more 
persons. 
 
Another aspect of the inquirer role is that it is a multi-
faceted role. As originally described, the inquirer asks 
questions of the participants, acting in a somewhat 
prosecutorial manner, and simultaneously is gauging 
the answers, acting in a somewhat judicial manner, 
along with ultimately rendering a decision as to the 
outcome of the Turing Test. Whether this is an unduly 
overloaded role has been previously questioned. 
Likewise, this brings up the corresponding concern 
that having one person that serves essentially as a mix 
of a prosecutor, judge, and jury would seem inherent 
to have the undue potential for problematic sway 
including incurring cognitive biases as the inquirer (an 
inquirer might be swayed by their own choice of 
questions, whereas if there was a separate evaluator 
they might independently be better served at assessing 
the answers of the participants, and so on). This matter 
is not addressed per se in this study and merely noted 
as a consideration about the nature of the Turing Test 
and for purposes of potentially spurring further 
research on the matter. 
 
All told, the person that undertakes the inquirer role is 
notably significant since how the person conducts the 
Turing Test is tantamount to shaping the worth of the 
effort and its outcome. Someone that is insufficiently 
capable in this role would undeniably undercut the 
significance of the Turing Test.  
 
In the overarching Turing Test, the inquirer is covering 
all facets of general intelligence. For purposes of the 
Turing Test utilization in the context of this study, the 
inquirer is focused on the discipline of legal reasoning. 
 
2.2.2 Element “Human Participant” 
 
The human participant is the barometer against which 
the AI system is being compared, and therefore it is 
essential to the Turing Test that the human participant 
be sufficiently capable in this role.  
 
As similarly discussed in the prior subsection about 
the inquirer, the human participant was originally 
depicted as one person rather than being multiple 
people at once. The underlying question arises 
regarding whether it is reasonable to expect that one 
person alone would be capable of serving in this 
crucial barometer capacity. As such, it is conceivable 
that the human participant could consist of one or 
more humans and that they would need to be 
coordinated in their efforts thereto. This is a concept 
deserving of additional research and will be so 
mentioned in Section 5. 
 
Another facet of the human participant is the base 
assumption that the human participant will genuinely 
perform when undertaking the Turing Test. If the 
human participant is insincere in their effort, it would 
undoubtedly undermine the nature of the testing 
activity. There is a counterargument sometimes made 
that this could also be a ploy by the AI, attempting to 
portray itself in a human-like manner. In that same 
logical vein, the human participant could attempt to 
masquerade as the AI, if one assumes that the AI can 
be so mimicked.  
 
Yet another aspect involves whether the human 
participant can be equipped with the use of a 
computer. Purists would tend to argue that the human 
should be entirely unaided and be acting solely based 
on their own intellect. Where this comes to play would 
involve the aspect of the inquirer asking each of the 
subjects to calculate a large value, and when one of 
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them is unable to do so or takes a long time to do so, 
the human participant is revealed. To solve this, the 
belief is that the human participant should be 
permitted to use a computer. But this introduces 
additional complications, such as if the computer is 
running the same AI as the AI being used for the 
comparator, does the Turing Test make any reasonable 
sense when the human participant is armed with the 
same AI. For purposes of this study, the viewpoint is 
taken that the human participant would likely need to 
have available some computer-based capacities due to 
the nature of the context, yet would need to be limited 
in having access to the AI per se (this is a matter 
mentioned further in Section 5 for future research 
exploration). 
 
In the overarching Turing Test, the human participant 
is expected to cover all facets embodying general 
intelligence. For purposes of the Turing Test 
utilization in the context of this study, the human 
participant is focused on the discipline of legal 
reasoning. 
 
2.2.3 Element “AI-Based Legal Reasoner” 
 
The computer-based AI is the comparator to the 
human participant.  
 
In the overarching Turing Test, the AI is intended to 
cover all facets of general intelligence. For purposes of 
the Turing Test utilization in the context of this study, 
the AI is focused on the discipline of legal reasoning 
and will be denoted as the AI-based Legal Reasoner. 
 
Referring to AI overall has an implied monolithic 
insinuation, which should not be necessarily taken or 
interpreted in that manner. It could be that the AI is a 
federated system with numerous components that 
work in conjunction with each other. Note that 
however the AI is formed, including the underpinnings 
of technology used, does not bear on the Turing Test 
in any substantive way. The Turing Test is essentially 
technology agnostic and there is no indication and nor 
assertion as to what or how the AI is composed and 
undertaken. 
 
Another aspect of the AI involves whether the AI 
might be devised to attempt trickery at mimicking the 
human participant or the nature of human responses. 
Some have labeled this ploy as a form of Artificial 
Stupidity, arising from the notion that if the AI is 
asked to calculate a complex equation, and arrives at 
an answer with fifty digits, this perhaps gives away the 
AI, and thus the AI might purposely act as though it 
only knows a few of the digits, or perhaps even offers 
the digits erroneously as though having made an error 
that a human might make. Some argue that this is 
entirely at the choice of the AI to decide whether to 
attempt and that doing so could either aid in the AI 
appearing to be human-like or might backfire on the 
AI by revealing that it is the AI and exploiting such a 
ploy by appearing to be dimwitted or human-like 
error-prone. 
 
2.2.4 Element “Queries of the Turing Test” 
 
The original establishment of the Turing Test did not 
specify the nature of the queries that the inquirer is 
supposed to ask of the human participant and the AI. 
Presumably, the inquirer should use their intellect to 
devise a sufficient series or set of questions that can 
achieve the end-goal of being able to ascertain whether 
the AI can be distinguished from the human 
participant. Furthermore, it might be reasonably 
assumed that the inquirer could devise new questions 
in real-time as needed, doing so in response to the 
answers of the AI or the human participant. This kind 
of interactive dialogue would seem the more likely 
means to try and discern the intellectual prowess of the 
subjects. 
 
Some have outlined the kinds of queries that might be 
used in a general intelligence Turing Testing. 
Nonetheless, there is no universally accepted set or 
specification of what the queries need to be. 
 
Per word choice, herein the word “query” or “queries” 
is used, rather than words such as “questions” or the 
“inquiries,” though those other phrasings are equally 
applicable and considered interchangeable for 
purposes herein. 
 
In the overarching Turing Test, the queries are 
expected to cover all facets embodying general 
intelligence. For purposes of the Turing Test 
utilization in the context of this study, the queries are 
focused on the discipline of legal reasoning. 
 
2.2.5 Element “Answers to the Turing Test” 
 
The answers that are to be provided by the human 
participant and by the AI are presumed to be 
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completely open-ended, meaning that their respective 
answers are whatever answers they wish to provide. It 
is then up the inquirer to decide whether the answers 
are appropriate and whether the answers are sensible 
or nonsensical, etc. 
 
In the overarching Turing Test, the answers are 
expected to cover all facets embodying general 
intelligence. For purposes of the Turing Test 
utilization in the context of this study, the answers are 
presumed to be focused on the discipline of legal 
reasoning. 
 
A longstanding question about legal reasoning is the 
degree to which law and legal reasoning involve and 
depend upon general intelligence, such that there 
might be little means of separating legal reasoning 
from general intelligence. In that sense, it could be 
asserted that the Turing Test in a legal context has no 
choice but to also involve the use of general 
intelligence, and therefore it is somewhat misleading 
to suggest that a Turing Test for legal reasoning is 
solely and exclusively only about the law and legal 
reasoning. This significant point is worthwhile to keep 
in mind. 
 
2.2.6 Element “Rules of the Turing Test” 
 
There are no established rules for the Turing Test, 
other than the general semblance of the inquirer opting 
to ask queries of the human participant and the AI, 
doing so in whatever manner the inquirer deems to do 
so. In other words, the inquirer does not need to 
alternate between the subjects, does not need to be 
balanced in asking questions, and so on. This is left 
entirely up to the discretion of the inquirer. 
 
In theory, the inquirer could ask queries of only one of 
the subjects and opt to not ask any of the other. 
Furthermore, the inquirer could ask just one question 
and offer no other questions for the subjects. Since it 
would be a seeming undermining of the Turing Test 
for the inquirer to take such a stance, it has been 
proposed that there should be some explicitly stated 
rules associated with the Turing Test. 
 
In the case of attempts at undertaking the Turing Test, 
there have been various rules sketched, though they 
have tended to be narrow and overly specific. For 
example, suppose a Turing Test is undertaken that 
stipulates the entire testing period will be five minutes 
in length. This does not seem a sufficiently long 
enough period to allow for a properly undertaken 
inquiry, and thus the resulting outcome would be 
specious or certainly suspect. 
 
In the overarching Turing Test, rules would 
presumably be crafted aiming to cover all facets 
embodying general intelligence. For purposes of the 
Turing Test utilization in the context of this study, 
rules are presumed to be focused on covering the 
discipline of legal reasoning. 
 
2.2.7 Element “Potential Observers” 
 
In the original description of the Turing Test, there is 
no delineation of whether there might be observers 
involved in the Turing Test. Essentially, it is not a 
topic particularly brought up or considered. 
Subsequently, it has been envisioned that there would 
seem to be value in having observers, without which 
otherwise the nature of the Turing Test might be 
perceived as less viably undertaken and ultimately 
discounted. 
 
Some assert that the inclusion of observers might 
impact the Turing Test and alter the results, somehow 
skewing the effort. Others point out that the observers 
could be kept astray of the matter and nonetheless still 
be able to observe the effort. If done properly, it can be 
argued that the inclusion of observers has no material 
effect on the Turing Test itself, while at the same time 
perhaps achieving an acceptance or acknowledgment 
of the result due to the allowance for having observers. 
 
In the overarching Turing Test, observers would be 
principally anyone having an interest in general 
intelligence. For purposes of the Turing Test 
utilization in the context of this study, observers are 
presumed to be focused on having a particular interest 
in the discipline of legal reasoning. 
 
2.2.8 Element “Conclusion Reached” 
 
The primary outcome of the Turing Test consists of 
the inquirer declaring which of the subjects is the AI. 
If the inquirer correctly states which is the AI, 
presumably the AI has failed at being able to showcase 
the equivalence of human intelligence and somehow 
given itself away, thus, “failing” the Turing Test. If the 
inquirer is unable to state which is the AI, presumably 
the AI has been able to showcase the equivalence of 
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human intelligence and thus “succeeded” in passing 
the Turing Test. 
 
There are numerous qualms about this simplistic 
standpoint. Suppose for example that the inquirer 
merely flips a coin to ascertain which of the subjects is 
the AI. In that case, would the AI have “succeeded” if 
the coin toss failed to select the AI, and would the AI 
have “failed” if the coin toss perchance selected the 
AI? This certainly does not seem suitable. Another 
concern is that doing the Turing Test perhaps once, 
and then declaring a failure or success does not seem 
especially valid, and perhaps it ought to be done 
repeatedly until some level of repeated efforts provides 
a more substantive basis for rendering a result. 
 
In the overarching Turing Test, the conclusion reached 
would be whether the AI has apparently demonstrated 
general intelligence. For purposes of the Turing Test 
utilization in the context of this study, the conclusion 
reached is whether the AI has achieved sufficiency in 
the discipline of legal reasoning. 
 
2.2.9 Element “Reverse Turing Test” 
 
The traditional or conventional Turing Test has been 
described in these subsections. A variant known as the 
Reverse Turing Test has been identified in the 
literature and variously defined. One variant is that the 
Reverse Turing Test consists of the inquirer having to 
identify which of the subjects is the human, rather than 
which of the subjects is the AI. This of course does not 
appear to be demonstratively different than the 
conventional approach since by the act of identifying 
which is the AI, by default the assumption is that the 
other subject is indeed the human participant. 
Nonetheless, some assert that the focus on trying to 
identify the human participant rather than the AI is a 
notable difference and therefore merits its special 
attention as an approach to the Turing Test. 
 
Another meaning for a Reverse Turing Test consists of 
the human participant attempting to masquerade as the 
AI. The basis for doing so is sometimes attributed to a 
software development technique called the Wizard of 
Oz, whereby a software developer pretends to be the 
computer and responds to human end-users, seeking to 
ferret out what kinds of interaction the human end-
users are desirous of having, and then programming 
the computer system accordingly. 
 
For purposes of the Turing Test utilization in the 
context of this study, the Reverse Turing Test is 
included as a form of completeness of coverage, 
without stipulating or assessing the value of the 
approach. 
 
3.0 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [20].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with the Turing Test key elements 
identified in the prior section of this paper, and thus it 
is useful to first explain what each of the autonomous 
levels consists of. 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
3.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
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a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
3.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
3.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
3.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
3.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [17] [18] [20].  
 
Essentially, this entails any AI legal reasoning 
capacities that can operate autonomously, entirely so, 
but that is only able to do so in some limited or 
constrained legal domain. 
 
3.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
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3.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
4.0 Turing Test Grid Integrating Autonomous 
Levels of AILR 
 
4.1 Grid Indication of Levels of Autonomy (LoA) 
by Key Factors 
 
In this section, the Turing Test key elements depicted 
in Section 2 are aligned into a grid that also contains 
the autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning which 
were described in Section 3. 
 
Figure B-1 provides an overview chart depicting the 
rows as the respective LoA AILR levels and the 
columns denoting the Turing Test elements. A row-by-
row explanatory narrative is provided in the 
subsections below. 
 
Figure B-2 provides a similar overview chart of 
Figure B-1 but does so with the rows indicating the 
Turing Test key elements and the columns showcasing 
the AILR autonomous levels. This is simply an 
alternative perspective of Figure B-1 and does not 
introduce any new content or alterations from the 
contents depicted in Figure B-1. A row-by-row 
explanatory narrative is provided in the subsections 
below. 
4.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 0 of the LoA 
AILR have an “n/a” (meaning not applicable) for each 
of the Turing Test key elements. 
 
This designating of “n/a” is logically suitable for Level 
0 since there is no autonomy associated with AILR at 
Level 0, therefore no relevancy in seeking to apply the 
Turing Test. Axiomatically, the Turing Test is 
inapplicable at Level 0. Any attempt to perform a 
Turing Test at Level 0 is inappropriate and unsuitable. 
 
Level 0 
• The Inquirer: n/a 
• Human Participant: n/a 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: n/a 
• Queries of the Turing Test: n/a 
• Answers to the Turing Test: n/a 
• Rules of the Turing Test: n/a 
• Potential Observers: n/a 
• Conclusion Reached: n/a 
• Reverse Turing Test: n/a 
 
4.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 1 of the LoA 
AILR has an “n/a” (meaning not applicable) for each 
of the Turing Test key elements. 
 
This designating of “n/a” is logically suitable for Level 
1 since there is no autonomy associated with AILR at 
Level 1, therefore no relevancy in seeking to apply the 
Turing Test. Axiomatically, the Turing Test is 
inapplicable at Level 1. Any attempt to perform a 
Turing Test at Level 1 is inappropriate and unsuitable. 
 
Level 1 
• The Inquirer: n/a 
• Human Participant: n/a 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: n/a 
• Queries of the Turing Test: n/a 
• Answers to the Turing Test: n/a 
• Rules of the Turing Test: n/a 
• Potential Observers: n/a 
• Conclusion Reached: n/a 
• Reverse Turing Test: n/a 
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4.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 2 of the LoA 
AILR has an “n/a” (meaning not applicable) for each 
of the Turing Test key elements. 
 
This designating of “n/a” is logically suitable for Level 
0 since there is no autonomy associated with AILR at 
Level 2, therefore no relevance in seeking to apply the 
Turing Test. Axiomatically, the Turing Test is 
inapplicable at Level 2. Any attempt to perform a 
Turing Test at Level 2 is inappropriate and unsuitable. 
 
Level 2 
• The Inquirer: n/a 
• Human Participant: n/a 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: n/a 
• Queries of the Turing Test: n/a 
• Answers to the Turing Test: n/a 
• Rules of the Turing Test: n/a 
• Potential Observers: n/a 
• Conclusion Reached: n/a 
• Reverse Turing Test: n/a 
  
4.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 3 of the LoA 
AILR indicate several specific designations associated 
with the respective Turing Test elements. 
 
Keep in mind that Level 3 is considered semi-
autonomous, therefore situated partially in 
conventional automation and partially into 
autonomous capabilities. Since Level 3 is not defined 
as unqualified autonomy, there is no expectation that 
Level 3 AILR would be able to pass or succeed at the 
Turing Test. Nonetheless, it might be useful to 
administer the Turing Test as a means of gauging the 
extent of autonomous capabilities, along with being 
able to guide on what further advances might be 
needed to achieve Level 4 or higher. 
 
For the inquirer, the preference is that an expert in 
legal reasoning would be utilized, rightfully so since 
the inquirer needs to be able to ask intelligent 
questions about the law, must be able to understand 
and assess the answers provided by the subjects 
participating, and must ultimately reach a conclusion 
about which is the human participant and which is the 
AI. The human participant should be an expert in the 
matters of legal reasoning being tested. The AI-based 
Legal Reasoner can consist of a minimal amount of AI 
legal reasoning capacity, having achieved a sufficient 
capacity to merit being categorized at Level 3. The 
queries of the Turing Test can be minimal in terms of 
the depth of exploration of legal reasoning, and 
likewise, the answers can be similarly of a minimal 
nature. Since this is viewed as a looser variant of the 
Turing Test, the rules of the matter can be minimal. 
Observers could be of an open nature and the 
conclusion reached by the inquirer is expected to be no 
greater than rated as “Notable” if the AILR can 
respond in a manner such that the Turing Test is 
considered as a pass. A Reverse Turing Test might be 
useful as a means to explore how to best further the 
AILR toward higher achievement in Level 3 or toward 
attainment of Level 4 or higher. 
 
Level 3 
• The Inquirer: Expert Preferred 
• Human Participant: Expert 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: Minimal 
• Queries of the Turing Test: Minimal 
• Answers to the Turing Test: Minimal 
• Rules of the Turing Test: Minimal 
• Potential Observers: Open 
• Conclusion Reached: Limited As “Notable” 
• Reverse Turing Test: Useful But Not  
                                 Substantive 
 
4.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 4 of the LoA 
AILR indicate several specific designations associated 
with the respective Turing Test elements. 
 
Level 4 is considered autonomous with respect to a 
given legal domain. Therefore, this is considered an 
opportunity for a full-scale Turing Test in AILR, 
though restricted to the domain so specified. There is 
no expectation that the AILR would be able to pass or 
succeed outside the domain stipulated.  
 
For the inquirer, an expert in the identified domain of 
legal reasoning would be utilized, rightfully so since 
the inquirer needs to be able to ask intelligent 
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questions about the law in that domain, must be able to 
understand and assess the answers provided by the 
subjects participating as it relates to the domain, and 
must ultimately reach a conclusion about which is the 
human participant and which is the AI. The human 
participant should be an expert in the legal domain of 
legal reasoning being tested. The AI-based Legal 
Reasoner is to consist of a domain-specific AI legal 
reasoning capacity that fits the domain entailed, 
having achieved a sufficient capacity to merit being 
potentially categorized at Level 4.  
 
The queries of the Turing Test should be bounded to 
the specific domain of legal reasoning, and likewise, 
the answers can be similarly bounded to the chosen 
domain. Since this is viewed as a full use of the Turing 
Test, the rules of the matter should be rigorously 
devised and applied. Observers would most likely be 
law specialists in the chosen domain and the 
conclusion reached by the inquirer is expected to be a 
domain-only pass if the AILR can respond in a manner 
such that the Turing Test is considered as succeeded. 
A Reverse Turing Test might be useful as a means to 
explore how to best further the AILR toward higher 
achievement in Level 4 or toward attainment of Level 
5 or higher. 
 
Level 4 
• The Inquirer: Expert in Domain 
• Human Participant: Expert in Domain 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: Domain Specific 
• Queries of the Turing Test: Domain Specific 
• Answers to the Turing Test: Domain Specific 
• Rules of the Turing Test: Rigorous 
• Potential Observers: Law Specialists 
• Conclusion Reached: Domain-Only Pass in 
                                   AILR 
• Reverse Turing Test: Useful in Domain 
. 
 
4.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 5 of the LoA 
AILR indicate several specific designations associated 
with the respective Turing Test elements. 
 
Level 5 is considered autonomous with respect to all 
legal domains. Therefore, this is considered an 
opportunity for a full-scale Turing Test in AILR, being 
undertaken without any restrictions regarding the legal 
domains involved. The Turing Test should purposely 
seek to explore all legal domains since otherwise there 
would remain untested areas and any conclusion 
would be considered problematic. 
 
For the inquirer, the likelihood is that one or more 
experts in the law would be utilized, rightfully so since 
an individual inquirer would seem unlikely to be able 
to encompass all legal domains, and the inquirer(s) 
need to be able to ask intelligent questions about the 
law in all legal domains, must be able to understand 
and assess the answers provided by the subjects 
participating as it relates to all legal domains, and must 
ultimately reach a conclusion about which is the 
human participant and which is the AI. The human 
participant might also consist of one or more experts 
due to the need to be able to respond across all legal 
domains and it seems unlikely that one individual 
could otherwise do so. The AI-based Legal Reasoner 
is to consist of an AI legal reasoning capacity that can 
be responsive across all legal domains, having 
achieved a sufficient capacity to merit being 
potentially categorized at Level 5.  
 
The queries of the Turing Test should be bounded to 
the realm of law and require legal reasoning, and 
likewise, the answers are similarly bounded. Since this 
is viewed as a full use of the Turing Test, the rules of 
the matter should be rigorously devised and applied. 
Observers would most likely be law professionals 
across a variety of legal domains and the conclusion 
reached by the inquirer is expected to be a full pass if 
the AILR can respond in a manner such that the 
Turing Test is considered as succeeded. A Reverse 
Turing Test would likely be useful as a means to 
explore how to best further the AILR toward higher 
achievement in Level 5 or toward attainment of Level 
6. 
 
Level 5 
• The Inquirer: Multiple Experts 
• Human Participant: Multiple Experts 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: All Domains 
• Queries of the Turing Test: All Domains 
• Answers to the Turing Test: All Domains 
• Rules of the Turing Test: Rigorous 
• Potential Observers: Law Professionals 
• Conclusion Reached: Full Pass in AILR 
• Reverse Turing Test: Useful Overall 
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4.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
As indicated in charts B-1 and B-2, Level 6 of the LoA 
AILR indicate several specific designations associated 
with the respective Turing Test elements. 
 
Level 6 is considered autonomous with respect to all 
legal domains. Therefore, this is considered an 
opportunity for a full-scale Turing Test in AILR, being 
undertaken without any restrictions regarding the legal 
domains involved. The Turing Test should purposely 
seek to explore all legal domains since otherwise there 
would remain untested areas and any conclusion 
would be considered problematic. 
 
Level 6 poses a fundamental difficulty since it is as yet 
unknown as to what a superhuman capacity in the law 
might consist of, thus attempting to assess this 
capability via a Turing Test would seem challenging. 
Potentially, seemingly intractable legal questions that 
have stymied human legal reasoning might be utilized. 
Overall, it is unclear how those devising a test of an AI 
that is presumably at a heightened level of intellect 
could be suitably established since those creating the 
test are operating at a lower level of intellectual 
capacity. In any case, the Turing Test still might be 
viably applied and the nature of doing so is worthy of 
additional research, as mentioned in Section 5 of this 
paper. 
 
For the inquirer, the likelihood is that one or more of 
the world’s topmost experts in the law would be 
utilized, rightfully so since an individual inquirer 
would seem unlikely to be able to encompass all legal 
domains and since the attempt involves trying to 
challenge a superhuman AI capacity, and the 
inquirer(s) need to be able to ask hyper-intelligent 
questions about the law in all legal domains, must be 
able to understand and assess the answers provided by 
the subjects participating as it relates to all legal 
domains, and must ultimately reach a conclusion about 
which is the human participant and which is the AI. 
The human participant might also consist of one or 
more of the world’s topmost experts due to the need to 
be able to respond across all legal domains and it 
seems unlikely that one individual could otherwise do 
so.  
 
The AI-based Legal Reasoner is to consist of an AI 
legal reasoning capacity that can be responsive across 
all legal domains, having achieved a sufficient 
capacity to merit being potentially categorized at Level 
6 and considered as presumably superhuman in 
capability. The queries of the Turing Test should be 
bounded to the realm of law and require legal 
reasoning, and likewise, the answers are similarly 
bounded. Since this is viewed as a full use of the 
Turing Test, the rules of the matter should be 
rigorously devised and applied. Observers would most 
likely be both those versed in the law and those non-
law observers interested in the superhuman capacity 
overall, and the conclusion reached by the inquirer is 
expected to be an exemplary pass if the AILR can 
respond in a manner such that the Turing Test is 
considered as succeeded. A Reverse Turing Test 
would likely be useful as a means to explore how to 
best further the AILR toward higher achievement in 
Level 6. 
 
Level 6 
• The Inquirer: Topmost Experts 
• Human Participant: Topmost Experts 
• AI-Based Legal Reasoner: Domain Plus 
• Queries of the Turing Test: Domain Plus 
• Answers to the Turing Test: Domain Plus 
• Rules of the Turing Test: Rigorous 
• Potential Observers: Law & Non-Law 
• Conclusion Reached: Exemplary Pass in 
                                 AILR 
• Reverse Turing Test: Useful Overall 
 
4.2 Grid Indication of Turing Test Key 
Elements by Levels of Autonomy (LoA) 
 
The next subsections showcase the Turing Test key 
factors as at-a-glance for each factor, listing the 
designations that have been postulated for each of the 
LoA AILR levels.  
 
Narrative discussion about these facets has already 
been covered in the prior Subsection 4.1 and thus it is 
not necessary to repeat it in this subsection (refer to 
the prior subsections as needed). 
 
4.2.1 Turing Test “The Inquirer” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “The Inquirer” for 
each of the LoA AILR levels, see the preceding 
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subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
The Inquirer 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Expert Preferred 
• Level 4: Expert in Domain 
• Level 5: Multiple Experts 
• Level 6: Topmost Experts 
 
4.2.2 Turing Test “Human Participant” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Human 
Participant” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Human Participant 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Expert 
• Level 4: Expert in Domain 
• Level 5: Multiple Experts 
• Level 6: Topmost Experts 
 
 
4.2.3 Turing Test “AI-Based Legal Reasoner” LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “AI-Based Legal 
Reasoner” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
AI-Based Legal Reasoner 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Minimal 
• Level 4: Domain Specific 
• Level 5: All Domains 
• Level 6: Domains Plus 
 
 
4.2.4 Turing Test “Queries of the Turing Test” by 
LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Queries of the 
Turing Test” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Queries of the Turing Test 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Minimal 
• Level 4: Domain Specific 
• Level 5: All Domains 
• Level 6: Domain Plus 
 
4.2.5 Turing Test “Answers to the Turing Test” by 
LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Answers to the 
Turing Test” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Answers to the Turing Test 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Minimal 
• Level 4: Domain Specific 
• Level 5: All Domains 
• Level 6: Domain Plus 
 
4.2.6 Turing Test “Rules of the Turing Test” by 
LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Rules of the 
Turing Test” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides 
the convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
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Rules of the Turing Test 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Minimal 
• Level 4: Rigorous 
• Level 5: Rigorous 
• Level 6: Rigorous 
 
4.2.7 Turing Test “Potential Observers” LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Potential 
Observers” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Potential Observers 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Open 
• Level 4: Law Specialists 
• Level 5: Law Professionals 
• Level 6: Law & Non-Law 
 
4.2.8 Turing Test “Conclusions Reached” by LoA 
For a narrative discussion about the “Conclusions 
Reached” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
 
Conclusion Reached 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Limited As “Notable” 
• Level 4: Domain-Only Pass in AILR 
• Level 5: Full Pass in AILR 
• Level 6: Exemplary Pass in AILR 
 
4.2.9 Turing Test “Reverse Turing Test” by LoA 
 
For a narrative discussion about the “Reverse Turing 
Test” for each of the LoA AILR levels, see the 
preceding subsections. This list shown here provides a 
convenience of indication and is also portrayed on 
charts B-1 and B-2. 
Reverse Turing Test 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: n/a 
• Level 2: n/a 
• Level 3: Useful But Not Substantive 
• Level 4: Useful in Domain 
• Level 5: Useful Overall 
• Level 6: Useful Overall 
 
5.0 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
The grid depicted in Figure B-1 and Figure B-2 is a 
strawman variant, meaning that the indications shown 
are an initial populating of the grid. Additional 
research is needed to explore the designations and 
ascertain whether the initial indications might be 
advisedly changed or possibly transformed into some 
other kind of designations, such as numeric scores or 
weights. 
 
Another aspect of additional research involves the 
Turing Test key elements that are utilized in this 
strawman variant. There are other ways to portray the 
elements, along with the possibility of adding elements 
or possibly opting to excise some of the elements from 
the grid. Research on such modifications is 
encouraged.  
 
As a final point, there are potentially greater questions 
that arise from the grid, alluded to earlier in the 
discussion of the prior sections, entailing what actions 
would be taken if indeed AILR can achieve the 
autonomous levels of Level 4, Level 5, and Level 6. 
There remain many such open issues, each deserving 
of suitable attention. 
 
This paper has proposed a variant of the Turing Test 
that is customized for specific use in the AILR realm, 
including depicting how this famous “gold standard” 
of AI fulfillment can be robustly applied across the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning. Such an 
instrument can aid in addressing the open question 
underlying how we will know when AILR has 
achieved autonomous capacities. 
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